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I. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
HIS year's Survey period had numerous homestead related cases.TThose picked for this review relate to issues of abandonment, des-
ignation for agriculture use, and filing a case under the Texas De-
claratory Judgment Act.
In Florey v. Estate of McConnell,1 the Austin Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of abandonment of a homestead. Mr. McConnell was
charged with murdering his wife, and to obtain legal representation for
his defense, he agreed to pay a fixed sum to his attorney, Florey. A note
and deed of trust covering McConnell's home was executed in favor of
Florey. Since the lien securing legal service fees was not one of the con-
* B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Winstead PC, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Texas A&M, J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney at Law, Win-
stead PC, Dallas, Texas.
1. 212 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied)
1073
SMU LAW REVIEW
stitutionally authorized liens against homestead property,2 the controlling
issue was whether the homestead had been abandoned. Abandonment of
a homestead occurs only through physical abandonment, death or aliena-
tion, and must be shown by "undeniably clear" evidence. 3 The determi-
nation of the validity of a deed of trust is made at the time it is executed,
and if invalid at that time, the deed of trust cannot have any legal effect
thereafter. Therefore, the inquiry on abandonment must relate to the
date of the execution of the deed of trust. The Austin Court of Appeals
noted the following facts which would not support Florey's argument of
abandonment. 4 First, the deed of trust did not contain any disclaimer of
the homestead protection.5 McConnell had designated the property as a
homestead with the appraisal district and had retained such status beyond
the date of the deed of trust execution. 6 McConnell testified that both he
and his minor children were living on the property when the crime oc-
curred, and his personal possessions and those of the children that re-
mained in the house. 7 He further testified that he did not have anywhere
else to live and would have identified the property as his home.8
In LaSalle Bank National Ass'n v. White,9 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals addressed issues concerning homestead, agricultural use, and eq-
uitable subrogation. White obtained a Texas home equity mortgage in
1999 for the purpose of refinancing an existing valid purchase money
mortgage, payment of existing ad valorem taxes, and a portion for the
direct benefit of White. Upon failure to pay the note, LaSalle Bank filed
for a home equity loan foreclosure, and White sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the principal and interest on the loan should be forfeited due to
violation of Texas constitutional law concerning home equity loans. The
Texas Constitution prohibits homestead property designated for agricul-
tural use from being used as collateral for a home equity loan.10 The
term "agricultural use" is used in the Texas Tax Code, chapter 23 in both
subchapter C and subchapter D.11 Subchapter C deals with the designa-
tion of land for agricultural use, while subchapter D concerns the ap-
praisal of agricultural land. 12 Although the subchapters' designation of
2. Texas provides for liens on homesteads only for purchase money mortgages, ad
valorem taxes, work or services performed on the house, and certain extensions of credit
and reverse mortgages. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.001(b) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2008).
3. Florey, 212 S.W.3d at 443-44.
4. Id. at 446.
5. Id. at 445.
6. Id. at 446.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 217 S.W.3d 573, 574-75 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. granted), rev'd in part
per curiam, 246 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. 2007). Subsequent to the Survey period, the Texas Su-
preme Court issued a per curiam opinion on the equitable subrogation issue. LaSalle Bank
Nat. Ass'n v. White, 246 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
10. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(I).
11. LaSalle, 217 S.W.3d at 575.




agricultural use is somewhat different,13 the court of appeals concluded
that for purposes of the Texas constitutional prohibition on pledging
lands used for agricultural use, that lands coming under the definition of
either subchapter C or subchapter D would qualify for such prohibition.14
Evidence showed the land was valued for agricultural purposes on the tax
rolls, that the valuation was based on subchapter D, and that tax certifi-
cates reflecting the special valuation were included in both the lender's
and the title company's file. 15 The court of appeals concluded that the
land was agricultural land which could not be used to secure a home eq-
uity loan. 16 The court of appeals further looked at the question of
whether the lender could be equitably subrogated to the rights of the
prior and valid purchase money mortgage holder and for funds used to
extinguish ad valorem taxes against the property. 17 Here, the courts of
appeals split, with the majority concluding that strict construction of the
applicable constitutional provision 18 was required and could not be ap-
plied where the refinance of debt secured by a homestead included the
advance of additional funds which were not secured by a valid home eq-
uity lien.19 The dissenting opinion by two justices argued that prior case
law from the Texas Supreme Court would uphold equitable subrogation
where the refinanced debt constituted a valid lien against the home-
stead.20 The dissent analyzed the supreme court precedent in Benchmark
Bank v. Crowder,21 and determined that it did permit equitable subroga-
tion, pointing out that the references to the Texas home equity constitu-
tional amendments were passed subsequent to the facts in Crowder and
were not determinative. 22 On review, the Texas Supreme Court spoke to
the equitable subrogation issue and concluded that Texas Constitution,
Article XVI, section 50(e) does not affect the doctrine of equitable subro-
gation.2 3 Consequently, the portion of the loan that refinanced the valid
purchase money mortgage and paid state property tax liens was equitably
subrogated and not subject to the constitutional forfeiture of principal
and interest.24
Another homestead lien case, The Cadle Company v. Ortiz,25 involved
13. Subchapter C establishes eligibility requirements for a person designating an agri-
cultural use, which includes that the agriculture is the owner's primary occupation and
primary source of income. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.42 (Vernon 2008). On the other
hand, subchapter D describes the types of uses of lands which would qualify for the tax
appraisal reduction, including soil cultivation, crop production, seed planting, raising live-
stock and other similar types of activities. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(2) (Vernon 2007).
14. LaSalle, 217 S.W.3d at 577.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 577-78.
18. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(e).
19. LaSalle, 217 S.W.3d at 578.
20. Id. at 579.
21. 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996).
22. LaSalle, 217 S.W.3d at 580-81.
23. LaSalle, 246 S.W.3d at 618-19 (per curiam).
24. Id. at 620.
25. 227 S.W.3d 831, 834, 836 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied).
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the validity of an improvement lien on a homestead and represented a
case of first impression for bringing suit under the Texas Declaratory
Judgment Act rather than the trespass to try title statute. Mrs. Ortiz ac-
quired a house, but excluded her husband's name on the deed to protect
the property from possible creditors seeking child support payments from
Mr. Ortiz. Two years later, Mrs. Ortiz contracted for improvements to
the house. On the credit application form, Mrs. Ortiz was listed as un-
married.2 6 Mrs. Ortiz testified that she signed the application blank and
that it was later completed by an employee at the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. Upon subsequent default by Ortiz, the Cadle
Company-which had acquired the contract, note, and deed of trust-
foreclosed, and Ortiz brought suit for wrongful foreclosure and sought
attorneys' fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.27
Ortiz argued that the lien was invalid because it was not executed by both
spouses as required by the Texas Constitution.28 In a two to one decision,
a majority of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found the homestead
lien to be invalid because it was not signed by both spouses. 29 The major-
ity distinguished this case from Brown v. Bank of Galveston,30 since the
homeowner in that case had made an affirmative statement in the earnest
money contract that he was a "single man."'31 To support such distinction,
the majority relied on two factors. 32 The first was that Mrs. Ortiz merely
signed her name to the contract, note, and deed of trust (omitting a dis-
cussion of the loan application) and made no mention of her marital sta-
tus. 33 Apparently at trial, Cadle did not assert that it was entitled to rely
upon the loan application, and because of this, the issue was side stepped
by the court. 34 The second factor that the court relied on was that Mr.
Ortiz was entitled to a homestead right in his spouse's property (even if it
was separate property), and Cadle had shown nothing to defeat Mr. Or-
tiz' homestead rights.35 The court noted that it is not necessary to have
one's name on real property documents in order to maintain a homestead
interest. 36 Consequently, the court concluded the mechanic's lien was in-
valid because the lien documentation did not include the signature of
both spouses.37 There was a vigorous and compelling dissent which fo-
26. Id. at 833-34.
27. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 2008).
28. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5)(A) allows liens against the homestead in certain
instances. This section provides that a marital homestead is "protected from forced sale,
for the payment of all debts except for: ... work and material used in constructing new
improvements thereon, if ... the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the
consent of both spouses ..... Id.
29. Cadle Co., 227 S.W.3d at 835.
30. 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1998).
31. Id. at 512.
32. Cadle Co., 227 S.W.3d at 835.
33. Id. at 836.
34. See id. at 836 n.3.
35. Cadle Co., 227 S.W.3d at 835.




cused on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and whether the circum-
stances were sufficient to defeat the failure of both spouses to execute the
homestead lien documents.38 The dissent asserted that it is well settled
law that estoppel may arise from conduct and from a failure to act. 39
First, Mrs. Ortiz testified that she intentionally listed herself as the sole
owner in the deed to the house to avoid potential creditor claims. Sec-
ond, the dissent looked at the incorrect credit application, the circum-
stances surrounding its execution, and the terms contained therein. Mrs.
Ortiz's signature followed a statement which certified the information in
the loan application as true, accurate, and complete. An additional state-
ment in the loan application provided that if the loan application was
prepared by a third party, the third party must sign certifying that the
statements therein were based upon true information provided by the ap-
plicant. The credit application was in fact signed by a representative of
National Home Services, the contractor for the improvements work.
Based on the loan application, the contract, note, and trust deeds that
were executed on June 13, 1996, identified Mrs. Ortiz as the "Owner,"
with the original owner of the debt being Statewide Mortgage Company.
The lien instruments were subsequently transferred to Green County
Bank on August 27, 1996, and ultimately to Cadle on December 2, 1999.
The case failed to mention whether the loan application was physically
reviewed and transferred through the intermediary to Cadle in connec-
tion with the acquisition of such debt. The dissent also relied upon
Brown and cited it for the proposition that a party's recitation that no
labor or materials were furnished prior to execution of the contract would
estop such owners from later asserting the contrary. 40 The dissent stated
that the recitation of Mrs. Ortiz as the "owner" was an affirmative mis-
representation since there were other ownership rights in the homestead
in favor of Mr. Ortiz. 41 Such actions, in the aggregate, on behalf of Mrs.
Ortiz were sufficient to support an equitable estoppel argument against
the invalidation of the mechanic's lien claim.42 The dissent further ar-
gued that Mr. Ortiz's rights should be subject to the same estoppel since
he had testified that he knew the property was solely in Mrs. Ortiz's name
and was supposed to sign the homestead lien documents to make them
enforceable. 43
Both the majority and dissent concluded that this case was properly
brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act and was not a trespass to
try title action. 44 This conclusion supported the awarding of attorneys'
fees, which are not available under the trespass to try title action.45 The
38. Id. at 839-41.
39. Id. at 839.




44. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001-.011 (Vernon 2008).
45. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001 (Vernon 2000); Cadle, 227 S.W.3d at 837-38.
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Texas Supreme Court case of Martin v. Amerman,4 6 distinguished be-
tween the two actions and required the party to bring an action under the
proper statute.47 The fact that construction of terms of a contract and
deed frequently have implications to the ultimate issue of title is not de-
terminative of whether the action can be brought under the trespass to
try title or Declaratory Judgments Act. 48 The court concluded that as-
sessing the validity of these lien instruments is a stated function of the
Declaratory Judgments Act.49 Since the issue was not strictly a cloud on
title but rather dealt with the interpretation of the validity of a homestead
lien, the court concluded that the use of the Declaratory Judgments Act
was proper, and thus, the award of attorneys' fees was affirmed.50
The next group of cases address condominium lien foreclosure,
mechanic's liens for temporary workers on a construction project, and
judgment lien notice.
A condominium lien is addressed in Herrington v. Sandcastle Condo-
minium Ass'n.51 Condominium owner Herrington failed to pay condo-
minium assessments and, after the challenged notices herein discussed,
the condominium association foreclosed its lien created in a condomin-
ium declaration against Herrington's condominium unit. Herrington ar-
gued that notices received from the condominium association did not
satisfy the notice provisions of the Texas Property Code52 because the
initial notice letter did not use the exact word "default" as called for in
the statute. The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District
found that the notice of default was sufficient since it used words such as
"past due assessments" and "delinquent amount," and specifically re-
ferred to the non-judicial foreclosure provisions of Texas Property Code
section 51.002.53
Reliance National Indemnity Co. v. Advance'd Temporaries, Inc.54 ad-
dressed whether a temporary employment agency which placed workers
at a construction project under a contract with a subcontractor furnished
labor within the meaning of chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code, enti-
tling such agency to a mechanic's lien. The general contractor for the
apartment construction job hired Gonzales to frame, dry wall, and roof
the project. Gonzales did not have sufficient employees and entered into
a contract with Advance'd to furnish approximately 100 employees. The
contract between Gonzales and Advance'd identified the workers as em-
ployees of Advance'd and required Advance'd to acquire workers com-
pensation insurance and general liability insurance, to give a limited
46. 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004).
47. Id. at 264-67.
48. Cadle Co., 227 S.W.3d at 837.
49. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon 2006)).
50. Id. at 838.
51. 222 S.W.3d 99, 100 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
52. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
53. Herrington, 222 S.W.3d at 101.
54. 227 S.W.3d 46, 47 (Tex. 2007).
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guaranty of the employee's work. The contract also restricted Gonzales
from utilizing the temporary employees to operate machinery, automo-
tive equipment, or work on ladders or scaffolds without Advance'd's
prior approval. Advance'd recruited and qualified the legal status of each
worker, as well as paid the salaries and payroll taxes, for each worker. 55
Gonzales received a weekly invoice for the temporary services. The con-
struction project was abruptly terminated, and the general contractor
paid Gonzales for his work. However, Gonzales failed to pay the full
amount owed to Advance'd. Advance'd gave notice of claim of a
mechanic's lien and filed an affidavit of lien. Suit followed to collect from
Gonzales and the general contractor's surety. The trial court held the
mechanic's liens invalid since Advance'd did not furnish labor within the
meaning of the statute. 56 The court of appeals reversed by holding that
Advance'd had furnished labor to the project, and upon appeal, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate holding but used a different ratio-
nale.5 7 The Texas Supreme Court framed the question as how one quali-
fies under the mechanic's lien statute as a person who "furnishes labor. '' 58
The supreme court rejected Reliance's argument that control and super-
vision of the temporary workers and responsibility for the quality of their
work were relevant in determining the party who furnished labor. 59 Like-
wise, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the borrowed employee doctrine,
concluding that it was a tort doctrine for the apportionment of responsi-
bility for employees who have more than one master.60 This case is one
in which the contract clearly spelled out the responsibilities between the
two masters.
The contract gave specific responsibility to Advance'd for hiring, firing,
paying, and insuring the workers, as well as final decisions on certain
working conditions. The control of the details of work performed at the
construction site was not a controlling factor in the determination of who
was the employer. Therefore, the supreme court determined that these
temporary workers were the employees of Advance'd and that Ad-
vance'd furnished labor to the project by providing the workers to Gon-
zales. 61 Also, the supreme court rejected Advance'd's argument that the
statutory requirements were not met because the contract did not identify
the specific workplace project.62 The supreme court concluded that the
mechanic's lien statute did not require identification of the project in the
contract, and it focused on the undisputed fact that the workers did in
fact provide labor at the subject project.63 Ultimately, the supreme court
rejected the seven factor test which the court of appeals had adopted
55. Id.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 49.
61. Id.




from other jurisdictions. 64 The appropriate test is whether the temporary
agency furnished labor, which turns on the relationship between the tem-
porary agency and its workers. 65 Here, the evidence conclusively estab-
lished that the temporary workers' employer was Advance'd, which had
the right to assert a mechanic's lien claim for labor furnished under the
statute.66 Regardless of its correctness, the supreme court's decision ap-
pears to make the process of protecting a construction project from
mechanic's lien claims nearly impossible even when labor suppliers are
not on the job site directing the work. If the general contractor had
known that Gonzales was not the party furnishing all the work, the gen-
eral contractor may not have paid Gonzales directly for all of such work
or may have required lien waivers or releases from Advance'd. In terms
of managing a construction site and avoiding mechanic's liens, this case
highlights the importance of knowing with whom you are contracting and
with whom they may contract.
Wilson v. Dvorak67 involved the construction of the statutory require-
ments for a judgment lien.68 The simplified facts of this case are that
Dvorak obtained a judgment against Donna Arledge and filed an abstract
of judgment. However, between the date of the judgment and the filing
of the abstract of judgment, Donna Arledge married and became known
as Donna Nix. Nevertheless, the abstract of judgment used her maiden
name. Knowing that the abstract of judgment might not be informative,
Dvorak filed a concurrent affidavit of judgment explaining the judgment
and judgment debtor's name change. The abstract of judgment was ap-
propriately filed and indexed in Bandera County under the names of the
judgment creditor and the maiden name of the judgment debtor; how-
ever, the affidavit of judgment was indexed by the Bandera County Clerk
using the names Dvorak and "Public." Dvorak did not discover the error
until after the property was purchased by Mr. Nix and had been sold to
the Wilsons. Dvorak brought suit alleging that the judgment lien should
take priority over the deed of trust lien recorded in connection with the
Wilsons' acquisition of the property.69 Judgment liens are created under
Texas statutes,70 and general statutory construction requires a court to
follow the plain meaning of the words of the statute. The abstract of
judgment lien statute requires the abstract of judgment to include the
name of the plaintiff and defendant, but the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals concluded that it is not bound to follow the exact meaning of the
words where they would frustrate the purpose and intent of the statute.7 '
The purpose of the abstract of judgment lien is to provide notice to subse-
64. Id.
65. Id. at 50-51.
66. Id. at 51.
67. 228 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
68. Id. at 229-30.
69. Id. at 231.
70. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon 2008).
71. Wilson, 228 S.W.3d at 233.
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quent purchasers and encumbrances of the existence of the judgment and
lien.7 2 Therefore, despite Dvorak's explicit following of the statutory re-
quirements, the court concluded that the abstract of judgment was insuffi-
cient to convey the notice that the statute intended. 73 Consequently, thejudgment lien would not be superior to the deed of trust lien granted by
the Wilsons to an innocent purchaser who was not required to search
every record in Bandera County to discover the existence of the judg-
ment lien.74 Furthermore, the court found that the judgment creditor has
the responsibility to verify that the county clerk has properly indexed the
abstract of judgment.75 Not only does this case underscore the impor-
tance of verifying that the county clerk properly indexes important docu-
ments, it also emphasizes the importance of understanding not only the
letter but the spirit of the law.
The interplay between a foreclosure sale and the bankruptcy's auto-
matic stay provisions were addressed in Stephens v. Hemyari.76 The crux
upon which the case turned was the exact wording of the bankruptcy
court order conditionally lifting the automatic stay. The bankruptcy
court's order specifically authorized posting a foreclosure notice in July
for a foreclosure sale in August. In fact, the substitute trustee posted the
property for foreclosure in August and conducted a foreclosure sale in
September. The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed cases discussing the
automatic stay which held that an order modifying the automatic stay
must be strictly construed.77 The court concluded that the bankruptcy
order specifically required foreclosure on and not at any time after Au-
gust 1, 2000.78 Since the issues were presented in the context of a sum-
mary judgment appeal, the court merely concluded that a fact issue
existed and refrained from holding that the foreclosure sale violated the
automatic stay.79 Nevertheless, this case is instructive in that the order
modifying the automatic stay must be carefully prepared and followed.
II. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
BACM 2001-1 San Felipe Road L.P. v. Trafalgar Holdings I, Ltd.80 rep-
resents a typical workout scenario and exemplifies the legal problems
which can arise from a failure to appropriately document the understand-
ing of the parties. 81 In this case, the documents purporting to establish
the parties' workout agreements (collectively, "the Repayment Agree-
ments") were unenforceable under the statute of frauds, which allowed




76. 216 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
77. Id. at 529.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 218 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
81. Id. at 143.
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the lender to proceed with remedies under the original loan documents
without regard to the failed modification.
Three separate borrowers affiliated through a common ownership
structure obtained loans from Trafalgar but ultimately defaulted. As a
precursor to loan workout negotiations, the lender's agent sent out a typi-
cal "pre-negotiation agreement. '82 The Repayment Agreements con-
sisted of a proposal sent by the borrowers outlining certain provisions
(including a twenty percent principal reduction plus an agreement to pay
the balance within four months and to bring the mortgages current imme-
diately). This proposal was sent by the Chairman of the Board of RCA,
who was the controlling party for the general partners of the borrowers.
Subsequent to the written proposal, a telephone conversation between
the principals occurred, but the contents were disputed. Thereafter, the
borrowers mailed a $250,000 check to the lender along with a cover letter
referencing the proposal and the telephone call. The lender negotiated
the check but later sent the borrowers a forbearance proposal, which the
borrowers negotiated, resulting in revised forbearance letters being pre-
pared and forwarded. Afterwards, the borrowers did not accept the pro-
posals nor make any further payments. The lender then sent a notice of
intent to accelerate, then accelerated, and posted for foreclosure. In re-
sponse, the borrowers filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure claiming breach
of contract. During this time, one of the borrowers found a purchaser for
the property if the loan could be assumed, but the lenders refused based
on the status of the loan, debt, and other reasons not material hereto.
The primary issue facing the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District was whether the Repayment Agreements were enforcea-
ble under the statute of frauds. The court considered whether the
Repayment Agreements could be considered either a new contract or a
modification of the existing contract.83 As a new contract, the court
found the Repayment Agreements did not satisfy the statute of frauds
because they did not contain every essential element of a contract within
the body of the writing.84 The Repayment Agreements did not properly
identify the parties to the contract 85 and did not identify the rate of inter-
est on the loan.86
82. See id. at 141. Typically, pre-negotiations do the following: (1) negate any agree-
ment of the parties without the same being memoralized and signed, (2) prevent a party
from asserting any agreement during the negotiation process until it is formalized in writ-
ing and executed, and (3) confirm that the parties are not obligated to reach any agreement
with respect to the subject matter of the workout.
83. Id. at 143-44.
84. Id. at 144.
85. Id. The Repayment Agreements totally ignored whether covenants in the Repay-
ment Agreements were to be performed by the Chairman of the Board of the general
partner personally, RCA, or its general partner Fidelity S. Corporation. The court con-
cluded the promisor was Fidelity S. Corporation, which was not named in any of the Re-
payment Agreements. Id.
86. Id. at 145.
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The court found the Repayment Agreements could be supported as a
modification under the statute of frauds, because they only modified and
specifically dealt with matters in the original agreement.8 7 Because the
Repayment Agreements were enforceable as a modification of the origi-
nal loan documents, the borrower was determined to have breached for
failing to immediately bring current the existing loan.88 The court con-
cluded that the term "immediately" meant that the borrower was not al-
lowed to miss the next month's payment date.89
Consequently, the court held the borrower was in breach of the modifi-
cation agreement, and the lenders could take appropriate remedial ac-
tion.90 This case, arising from a typical workout situation, underscores
the need to document every detail of the parties' understanding in a sepa-
rate written instrument rather than the parties' reliance upon back and
forth communication, some of which are verbal and may tend to be
disputed.
III. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
The interpretation of compliance with the fair notice requirements
under a contractual indemnity clause was addressed in American Home
Shield Corp. v. Lahorgue.91 This case arose out of a spa heater explosion.
The heater had been serviced by a service contractor ("Turn-Key") work-
ing under a servicing agreement with American Home Shield Corp.
("Home Shield"). After Home Shield settled with the injured home-
owner, it filed against Turn-Key under the contractual indemnity provi-
sions of the servicing agreement.
Turn-Key defended on the basis that the indemnity provisions did not
meet the fair notice requirements for contractual indemnity clauses,
which contains both conspicuousness requirements and the express negli-
gence doctrine.92 The Dallas Court of Appeals reasoned that the notice
in the contract did not meet the conspicuousness test for the following
reasons: the service agreement consisted of a single page (printed front
and back), the agreement contained twenty-two numbered paragraphs,
the signature lines were at the bottom of the front side of the agreement
(with the indemnity provision on the back side), and the indemnity provi-
sion was the first of a series of numbered paragraphs, which were in the
same font size, same type face and same color as the rest of the agree-
ment, and had no descriptive headings. 93 Thus the indemnity provision
was no more visible than any other provision and did not appear to be
designed to draw the attention of a reasonable person against whom the
87. Id. at 146.
88. Id. at 147.
89. Id. at 147-48.
90. Id. at 148.
91. 201 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 184-85.
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clause was to operate.94 Consequently, the court ruled that the indemnity
provision was not conspicuous as required by the Texas Supreme Court.
95
Since the conspicuousness test was not satisfied, the court did not ad-
dress the express negligence test.96 However, Home Shield raised an af-
firmative defense that Turn-Key had actual knowledge of the indemnity
provision, which is a recognized exception to the fair notice require-
ments.97 The only proof offered by Home Shield was an affidavit of
Turn-Key's owner which recited that he had read the servicing agree-
ment. The court rejected this evidence as insufficient to support Home
Shield's claim, reasoning that to hold that "reading the agreement is
enough to by-pass the fair notice requirements would allow the exception
to swallow the rule and render the fair notice requirements ineffectual in
all but the most rare instances."'98 In so holding, the court rejected the
reasoning in Coastal Transportation Co. v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp.99 in which the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Dis-
trict held that actual notice was established where a president of a party
had read the agreement containing the indemnity provision.
Cabo Construction, Inc. v. R S Clark Construction, Inc.a00 involved an-
other indemnity provision and addressed the express negligence rule.
The Houston Court of Appeals for the First District examined the spe-
cific indemnification provision 0 1 and concluded that the indemnity provi-
sion stated that Cabo indemnified the owner and contractor for claims
arising from Cabo's negligence, but it did not expressly state that Cabo
would indemnify the owner and contractor for claims arising from their
own negligence. 10 2 Because the indemnity clause was unclear on who
was indemnified and for what they were indemnified, the court concluded
that the provision was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. 10 3 In
coming to this conclusion, the court considered other cases dealing with
94. Id. at 185.
95. Id.; see also Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex.
1993).
96. American Home Shield Corp., 201 S.W.3d at 185.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 186.
99. 20 S.W.3d 119, 126-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
100. 227 S.W.3d 314, 315-16 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
101. The document was the standard form of agreement between contractor and sub-
contractor, promulgated as AIA Document A401-1997 and read in relevant part as follows:
... Subcontractor [Cabo] shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner...,
Contractor ... from and against claims, damages, losses and expenses, in-
cluding but not limited to attorneys' fees, arising out of or resulting from
performance of the Subcontractor's [Cabo's] Work under this Subcontract
... but only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the
Subcontractor [Cabo], the Subcontractor's Sub-subcontractors, anyone di-
rectly or indirectly employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be
liable, regardless of whether or not such claim, damage, loss or expense is
caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder ....
Id. at 316 n.1.
102. Id. at 317.
103. Id. at 318.
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the express negligence rules. 10 4 The court analyzed the differences in the
indemnity provisions presented in these cases, focusing on the clear lan-
guage which provided that the indemnity was "regardless of" or "without
regard to" the negligence of the indemnified party. 105 Nevertheless, the
court's ruling in Cabo Construction Co. focused more on the specific lan-
guage limiting the indemnity to the "negligent acts or omissions of
[Cabo].' 1 0 6 This case is illustrative and beneficial to the practitioner as to
how slight variations in language will affect the determination of whether
the indemnity language passes the express negligence test.
Lavendar v. Bunch10 7 involved a suit by one guarantor against his co-
guarantors. All four guarantors had jointly and severally guaranteed a
debt of Site Constructors, Inc. to Hibernia Bank, and the guaranty agree-
ment was further secured by a pledge of a certificate of deposit individu-
ally owned by co-guarantor, Bunch. Bunch then purchased the note and
lien from Hibernia Bank, released the certificate of deposit to himself,
and brought suit against the other co-guarantors on the guaranty agree-
ment for the full amount of the indebtedness owed to the bank. The Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals determined that Bunch, as the assignee of the
bank, stood in the shoes of the bank with respect to the various loan
documents.' 0 8 Because the loan documents allowed the noteholder to
release any security and Bunch had actually released the certificate of
deposit, rather than going through a foreclosure of the security interest in
such certificate of deposit, the court concluded that the release did not
constitute an accord and satisfaction of the debt as asserted by the other
co-guarantors.' 0 9 However, the court, citing Byrd v. Estate of Nelms, 110
held that the position of a note's assignee would not trump his position as
a co-guarantor, and consequently, the well-established equitable princi-
pals of contribution among co-guarantors would limit his recovery to sev-
enty-five percent of the total debt.1 11
In First Commerce Bank v. Palmer,1 12 the Texas Supreme Court consid-
ered whether there was sufficient consideration to support guaranties
signed after a renewal note evidencing the underlying debt. The relevant
104. Id. at 318-19; see Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 50, 58(Tex. 1991) (applying Kansas law rather than Texas law to indemnity provisions); Enserch
Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 8 (Tex. 1990) (holding that the indemnity agreement passed
the express negligence test where the language sufficiently defined the owner's intent);Adams v. Spring Valley Constr. Co., 728 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
ref'd, n.r.e.) (holding language insufficient to indemnify because it did not expressly state
that it indemnified the owner's negligence); Ard v. Gemini Exploration Co., 894 S.W.2d 11,14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that the indemnity agree-
ment passed the express negligence test because it agreed to indemnify and clearly stated
for owner's own negligence).
105. Cabo Constr., Inc., 227 S.W.3d at 319.
106. Id. at 319-20.
107. 216 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
108. Id. at 552.
109. Id. at 553.
110. 154 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied).
111. Lavender, 216 S.W.3d at 554.
112. 226 S.W.3d 396, 396-97 (Tex. 2007).
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facts were that an underlying debt duly guaranteed by the Palmers was
renewed by execution of a new note on March 30, 1988. The new note
was not guaranteed by the Palmers until August 9, 1988. There was con-
tradictory evidence at trial as to whether the note and guaranties were
actually executed on the same date but dated inconsistently.
Nevertheless, the supreme court noted that Texas courts have enforced
guaranties without the requirement of additional consideration with re-
spect to previous underlying obligations. 113 Here, the supreme court con-
cluded that the new guaranties executed by the Palmers were supported
by consideration consisting of the bank's forbearance on the original 1983
guaranties, as well as the bank's agreement to renew and extend the origi-
nal debt. 114 Persuasive to this argument was the fact that the guaranty
agreement specifically allowed the bank to "rearrange, extend and/or re-
new the Indebtedness without notice to the Guarantor and in such event
Guarantor will remain fully bound hereunder on such Indebtedness. '"15
In a secondary allegation, the Palmers contended that they were re-
leased from liability under their guaranties due to impairment of collat-
eral, but this was summarily rejected since the guaranty agreements
specifically authorized the creditor to waive and release any security and
relief the creditor of any obligation to proceed against or exhaust a par-
ticular security as a condition of pursuing the guaranty.
116
IV. USURY
In Sturm v. Muens,117 the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District discussed how the parole evidence rule interfaces with a
usury claim. Sturm executed a $85,000 note to Muens bearing interest at
eighteen percent and also, entered into an agreement selling certain ac-
counts receivable to Muens for ten dollars with a repurchase option at the
maturity of the note for $35,700. The interest rate and the accounts paya-
ble repurchase price, if deemed interest, would constitute a usurious in-
terest rate of sixty percent. To prove his usury claim, Sturm had to
present evidence that the assignment of the receivables was consideration
for making the loan. In response, the Muens raised the parole evidence
rule to bar evidence that the note was not the final agreement among the
parties with respect to interest.
In addressing the parole evidence rule, the court noted that Texas law
precludes the enforcement of inconsistent, prior, or contemporaneous
agreements," 8 but that the parole evidence rule does not apply to pro-
hibit introduction of evidence offered to show that an agreement should
not be enforced for reasons of illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of
113. Id. at 398.
114. Id. at 399.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 224 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
118. Id. at 762.
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consideration, or other invalidating causes. 119 The court of appeals ap-
plied the rule in Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc. 21 where
the Texas Supreme Court determined that for Three Bears to establish
usury, it must first establish that the leases on which the usury claim was
made were not mere leases but were instead lease purchase agree-
ments.121 The distinction between the two was that the parole evidence
rule applies where a contract is inconsistent with but not merely collateral
to the contract under review.122 Thus, where a written agreement does
not purport to be a loan transaction at all, parole evidence is not admissi-
ble to show that the agreement is, in fact, a loan. 2 3 The court here deter-
mined that parole evidence is admissible only to show usury-the
exaction of greater compensation than is allowed by law for the use of
money.1 24 Consequently, the agreement relating to the accounts receiva-
ble was not barred by the parole evidence rule for the purpose of showing
that the note, otherwise valid on its face, was in fact a usurious loan. 2 5
Usury cure rights afforded a creditor were addressed in Sotelo v. Inter-
state Financial Corp.' 26 Sotelo executed a note and deed of trust in favor
of Interstate Financial Corp. ("Interstate") in February 2000. After a de-
fault, Interstate foreclosed the deed of trust lien in March 2003. In June
2003, Sotelo brought a wrongful foreclosure suit. In March 2004, he
amended it to allege usury. In January 2005, the trial court abated the
case to allow Sotelo to send Interstate notice of the usury claim pursuant
to the Texas Finance Code.127 Thirty-four days later, Interstate's counsel
responded by letter releasing Sotelo from all obligations under the note
except for the principal amount to which Sotelo had previously agreed.' 28
Sotelo alleged that only $17,000 of the principal was her debt, and that
the remainder of the $240,000 debt was interest because she had been
forced to assume her father's pre-existing business debt with Interstate.
The Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold129 usury claim was not addressed. 30 The
text of the release letter was quoted in a footnote, and interestingly, the
exact language of the letter releases Sotelo from "personal liability" for
payment of any amount which might be characterized as interest.131
119. Id.
120. 586 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1979).
121. Strum, 224 S.W.3d at 763.
122. Id. at 763.
123. Id. at 763-64.
124. Id. at 763, n.8. The elements of usury are: (i) a loan of money; (ii) an absolute
obligation to repay the principal; and (iii) the exaction of greater compensation than al-
lowed by law for the borrower's use of the money. Only in the third element is parole
evidence admissible. Id. at 761.
125. Id. at 764.
126. 224 S.W.3d 517, 518 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).
127. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(b) (Vernon 2006); Sotelo, 224 S.W.3d at 519.
128. Sotelo, 224 S.W.3d at 519.
129. 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1983) (holding that a lender who requires a borrower to
assume a third party's debt as a condition to making a loan must include the amount of the
third party's debt in the interest computation).
130. Id. at 519.
131. Sotelo. 224 S.W.3d at 519 n.5.
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Sotelo defended the summary judgment order against her on the
grounds that the correction letter from Interstate was not timely submit-
ted under section 305.103 of the Texas Finance Code. 132 Sotelo asserted
that the amended pleadings in March 2004 represented the date of the
creditor's discovery of the violation. However, this section is inconsistent
with Texas Finance Code sections 305.006(b) and (C), 1 3 3 which provides a
creditor the right to correct a usury violation in the manner provided by
Texas Finance Code section 305.103 during the period of sixty days after
receipt of the notice alleging usury from the debtor.
The El Paso Court of Appeals was bound by the canon of statutory
construction that required it to give effect to all statutes where appropri-
ate. But the court reasoned that Texas Finance Code section 305.006(b)
would be rendered ineffectual if it accepted Sotelo's argument that the
sixty-day limit for the creditor to cure usury began when the suit was filed
rather than upon receipt of notice. 134 Consequently, the court held that




This Survey period involved numerous cases interpreting "as is" clauses
and their effect on the implied warranty of good and workmanlike per-
formance-four were chosen to discuss.
The "as is" clause issue in Haire v. Nathan Watson Co. 136 turned on the
pre-purchase knowledge of the purchaser concerning the specific defect
alleged to be a breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike
performance under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA").
In purchasing their home, the Haires signed a sales contract which in-
cluded in three places "as is" language relating to foundation problems in
both the subdivision in general and the specific home under contract.
The homeowner's disclosure also detailed the neighborhood foundation
concerns and included a foundation report by a structural engineer noting
previous foundation movement. Additionally, the purchasers own in-
spector examined the foundation and advised that maintenance would be
required. 137
The homeowners did not file against the seller or the builder, but sued
the subdivision developer, Nathan Watson Co. ("Nathan Watson"), and
its geotechnical engineering firm, Fugro South, Inc. ("Fugro"). Since the
"as is" clauses were contained in the sales contract from the seller and not
132. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103 (Vernon 2006) (stating in relevant part, that: "A
creditor is not liable . . . if: (1) not later than the 60th day after the date the creditor
actually discovered the violation, the creditor corrects the violation as to that
obligor ... ").
133. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(b)-(c) (Vernon 2006).
134. Sotelo, 224 S.W.3d at 522-23.
135. Id. at 523.
136. 221 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
137. Id. at 296.
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the contracts with Nathan Watson and Fugro, the homeowners alleged
the clauses were not applicable. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that the homeowner was not precluded from suing the subdivision devel-
oper and its engineering firm despite the "as is" provision in the sales
contract.
138
The next issue was whether the professional services exemption in the
DTPA barred a cause of action against design professionals. 139 However,
the court declined to address this issue because it concluded that the pre-
purchase knowledge of the purchaser was sufficient to waive the implied
warranty of good and workmanlike performance.
140
Welwood v. Cyprus Creek Estates, Inc.14 1 also involved the interpreta-
tion of an "as is" clause and implied warranty of good and workmanlike
development.142 The "as is" clause in a lot sale contract from Cyprus
Creek Estates to Welwood's company, Hawkins-Welwood Homes, L.P.
("HWH"), was a typical and well drafted "as is" clause. Because the lot
in question was conveyed by HWH, Welwood argued that, as a remote
purchaser, the "as is" clause should not have been applicable because
Welwood was not a party to that contract.
The court concluded that Welwood negotiated the contract on behalf
of HWH, had actual knowledge of the "as is" agreement and the dis-
claimer of warranties, and thus could not "leap-frog over HWH" to avoid
the effect of the "as is" waiver. 143 The Dallas Court of Appeals did not
reach the issue of whether a remote purchaser who has no knowledge of
an "as is" clause in a remote contract is bound by such a provision. Next,
Welwood asserted the implied warranty and argued that he should have
been able to assert such implied warranties against the remote seller. The
court discussed other cases from the Texas Supreme Court that allowed
downstream parties without privity to sue on breach of implied warranty
claims but concluded those cases only applied in the absence of a valid
disclaimer in the original contract.1 44 Welwood failed to show any of the
exceptions for which an "as is" clause would not be enforced,1 45 and
therefore, the "as is" agreement was valid as to Welwood. Welwood also
argued that the implied warranty of good and workmanlike development
could not be disclaimed by such an "as is" provision. The court consid-
ered other disclaimers of implied warranties and concluded that, in the
138. Id. at 301.
139. See Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.49(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
140. Haire, 221 S.W.3d at 302.
141. 205 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
142. Id. at 725.
143. Id. at 728.
144. Id. at 729; but see discussion of Haire case above, which the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals allowed a downstream party to sue a remote design professional, but whose action
was defeated due to actual pre-purchase knowledge.
145. Examples of such exceptions include fraudulent inducement by misrepresentation
or concealment, obstruction of the buyer's right to inspection, the totality of the circum-
stances, the incidental or boiler plate recitations, and the relative bargaining positions of
the parties. See id. at 727.
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absence of public policy concerns, the implied warranty of construction
and habitability could be disclaimed in this case, especially because the
actual standard of care was stated.1 46 The warranty of habitability, while
not disclaimable, was not applicable here. 147
In another "as is" clause case, Kupchynsky v. Nardiello,148 the Dallas
Court of Appeals issued a split opinion. Kupchynsky contracted to sell
his residence to Nardiello. During the inspection period, Nardiello raised
issues concerning construction defects relating to two balconies, and
these construction issues were discussed amongst the buyer, seller, and
the subcontractor who built the balconies. Representations were made
that the balconies were built in accordance with the plans and were func-
tioning properly.
The contract contained an "as is" clause, but after the purchase, the
buyer sued over the defects in the balconies. The seller asserted that the
buyer's independent inspections of the house and renegotiation of the
sales contract indicated that the buyer did not rely on the representations
regarding the balconies. However, the court found that the buyer did not
renegotiate the contract over concerns with the balcony. Rather, the re-
negotiation was based on the thirteen other repair items specified by the
buyer.149
Next, the court addressed the seller's assertion that the "as is" clause
negated causation as a matter of law. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Jeffer-
son Associates, Ltd. o50 acknowledges that the totality of the circum-
stances may justify an exception to the general rule upholding "as is"
clauses. 151 In determining whether an "as is" clause should be given ef-
fect, courts consider whether the clause was an important basis of the
bargain rather than an incidental or boiler plate provision and whether
the parties were of a relatively equal bargaining position. 152 Here, the
court distinguished the present contract from Prudential, which contained
an "as is" clause containing specific language reciting that the buyer took
the property with all latent and patent defects. Conversely, the parties, in
Kupchynsky used a standard Texas real estate form for residential proper-
ties,153 and they never discussed the "as is" clause. 154 Consequently,
since the "as is" clause was not an important basis of the bargain, it did
not negate causation as a matter of law.155
146. Id. at 730.
147. Id. at 731.
148. 230 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
149. Id. at 689.
150. 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex. 1995).
151. Id. An "as is" clause typically contains an agreement by the buyer that it is not
relying on representations made by the seller. See id.
152. Kupchynsky, 230 S.W.3d at 690 (citing Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162).
153. The contract form used was Texas Real Estate Commission Form TREC 20-5. Id.
at 699 n.11.
154. Id. at 691.
155. Id.
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A well-reasoned and vigorous dissent focused on the burden of plead-
ing and proof with respect to the effectiveness of an "as is" clause. The
dissent began its attack by noting that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 94
requires that a party must affirmatively plead matters constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense. 156 The dissent concluded that the buy-
ers failed to plead any grounds for disregarding the "as is" clause, and
thus, they waived the affirmative defense based on the "as is" clause.
157
The effectiveness of an "as is" clause as it relates to an implied war-
ranty of suitability in a commercial lease context was addressed by the
Texas Supreme Court in Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider.158 Gym-
N-I Playgrounds, Inc. ("Gyn-N-I") leased a warehouse building from
Snider, and the lease contained an "as is" clause and an express dis-
claimer of express or implied warranties of suitability for a particular pur-
pose. 159 When a fire destroyed the building, the tenant sued the landlord
under an implied warranty of suitability based on claims that defective
wiring and lack of a sprinkler system caused the fire.
Gym-N-I first alleged that the "as is" clause was inapplicable because
the tenancy, at the time of the fire, was under a month-to-month holdover
tenancy provision in the lease, for which they argued that the "as is" pro-
vision was inapplicable. However, the supreme court looked at the plain
language of the holdover provision which stated that holding over would
be deemed on a month-to-month basis "under the terms and provisions
of this lease," and it held that such plain and ordinary meaning would
make the "as is" provision applicable to the holdover tenancy.
160
Next, Gym-N-I argued that the "as is" provision could not nullify an
implied warranty of suitability. But, the Texas Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held that parties to a commercial lease can, by express
written agreement, negate the implied warranty of suitability.1 61 In so
holding, the supreme court distinguished other cases as not involving an
express disclaimer of the implied warranty of suitability162 and recog-
nized that allowing waiver of the implied warranty of suitability would be
in contrast to the implied warranty of habitability, which is waivable only
156. Id. at 697. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
157. Id.
158. 220 S.W.3d 905, 909-12 (Tex. 2007).
159. Id. at 907 n.1.
160. Id. at 908-09.
161. The court however specifically noted that it did not address whether an "as is"
clause lacking express disclaimer language would effectively waive the implied warranty of
suitability, 220 S.W.3d at 910 note 7, relying on its previous holdings in Davidow v. Inwood
North Prof I Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988) (recognizing the implied war-
ranty of suitability, but noting that an agreement's terms can alter that warranty), and
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995)
(holding that absent fraud in the inducement, an "as is" provision can waive claims based
on the condition of the property). Gym-N-I Playgrounds, 220 S.W.3d at 910-12.
162. Id. at 910-11 (distinguishing Parts Indus. Corp. v. A.V.A. Servs., Inc., 104 S.W.3d
671 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) and Gober v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).
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to the extent that defects are adequately disclosed. 163
In Chapman v. Olbrich,164 the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District addressed whether a sales contract addendum constituted
a valid exception to title and whether formal tender of the purchase price
was excused. After the sales contract was executed, a survey was pre-
pared showing a boundary line running through a swimming pool on the
property. An addendum to the contract was executed extending the clos-
ing date for the purpose of allowing time to remedy the swimming pool
encroachment. But, the extended deadline passed without a closing, and
the owner sold the subject property and two adjoining properties to a
third party. The contract purchasers sued for specific performance.
The sellers argued that the addendum was a valid title exception and
that the contract terminated at the extended deadline date. However, the
court concluded that the specific language of the contract and addendum
was such that the addendum did not contain title objections.
Next, the court addressed the sellers argument that the contract pur-
chasers failed to tender the purchase price. The court concluded that
tender was excused due to the seller's repudiation of the contract arising
from the following actions: the seller entered into a contract to sell the
properties to a third party after the extended closing date; the new con-
tract made no reference to the original contract in controversy; the state-
ment by seller to buyer that the "contract is over;" and the actual closing
of a sale to a third party despite the pendency of the subject lawsuit and a
recorded lis pendens.165 The court also concluded that tender was excused
due to futility-the seller's refusal to close the original contract, even on
more favorable terms, was clear and compelling evidence that tendering
performance under the contract terms would have been a useless act.' 66
In LTS Group, Inc. v. Woodcrest Capital, L.L.C.,167 the Dallas Court of
Appeals considered whether a purchaser bound by an executory contract
could recover against a later purchaser of the same property, when both
purchasers had been negotiating the assignment of the original contract.
In anticipation of assigning its executory sales contract with a third party
to Woodcrest Capital, L.L.C. ("Woodcrest"), LTS Group, Inc. ("LTS")
supplied Woodcrest with due diligence information. However, before ne-
gotiations concluded, LTS reached the closing date. After failing to get
an extension, LTS cancelled the contract. Woodcrest never paid LTS for
the due diligence information. Woodcrest later acquired the property di-
rectly from the seller, and LTS sued under a quantum meruit theory for
$200,000 (the claimed value of the due diligence materials supplied). The
court rejected this position since a quantum meruit theory must be sup-
ported by evidence that the efforts undertaken were for the benefit of the
163. Gym-N-I, 220 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W. 3d 266, 274
(Tex. 2002)).
164. 217 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
165. Id. at 491-92.
166. Id. at 493.
167. 222 S.W.3d 918, 919-20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
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person sought to be charged. 168 The Dallas Court of Appeals reasoned
that the evidence did not support such a finding because the expectation
of a future business advantage or opportunity could not form the basis for
a claim under quantum meruit.a69 Further, the court found that there was
no reasonable evidence of the value of the materials supplied. Rather,
the testimony from LTS in support of the $200,000 claim focused on what
a brokerage fee might have been based on the proposed transaction and
not on evidence of the reasonable value of the work performed and
materials actually furnished. 170
In Mandell v. Mandell,171 the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District addressed a preferential purchase right. David Mandell
and the Mandell Estate entered into a settlement agreement containing a
preferential purchase right in the event either sold any portion of the
subject property. But, when David Mandell conveyed a 3.75% undivided
interest in the property to his attorney as part of a fee agreement he as-
serted that this was not a "sale." Rather, he argued that the conveyance
did not fall within the terms of the preferential purchase option. Because
there was no distinction in the terms "conveyance" and "sale," the court
concluded that David Mandell breached the preferential purchase right
by conveying the undivided interest to his attorney.172
Sefzik v. Mady Development, L.P.173 involved the interpretation of
contract provisions regarding the payment of "rollback taxes."'1 74 Sefzik
sold a tract of land to Mady, retaining a portion for himself. The land had
been subject to an agricultural use exemption, and after the sale, the Ap-
praisal District asserted increased taxes for the year of sale based on a
change of usage. The contract's tax proration provisions were the basis of
this dispute.175
The buyer asserted that the standard post-closing proration paragraph
controlled, which required the parties to readjust the prorations based
upon the final tax amounts determined after closing. But, the seller ar-
gued that the special provision relating to rollback taxes controlled, which
required the buyer to pay all additional assessments for periods before
the closing if the sale or change in use of the property resulted in addi-
tional assessments.
The Dallas Court of Appeals decided that the paragraphs were not am-
biguous and thus would determine which was applicable under standard
rules of construction.' 76 The court rejected Mady's argument that the
term "rollback taxes" used in the contract should have the same meaning
168. Id. at 921.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 214 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
172. Id.
173. 231 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
174. The case contains a discussion about the meaning of the term "rollback taxes." See
id. at 461-62 and n.5, 6.




as used in the Texas Tax Code and the Comptroller's Agricultural Ap-
praisal Manual. The merger clause177 confirmed that the document itself
represented the entire understanding of the parties, without reference to
outside materials unless incorporated. 178 The court also noted that the
use of the term "rollback taxes" in a heading would not outweigh the
operative clauses in the contract. 179 The rollback tax provision used the
term "additional assessments" resulting from a sale or change of use and
not just "rollback taxes." Using established rules of construction by giv-
ing specific provisions control over general provisions, the court con-
cluded that the seller's interpretation was correct, and that the additional
taxes were the responsibility of the buyer under the rollback tax clause in
the contract. 180
The validity of a jury waiver clause is addressed in Mikey's Houses
LLC v. Bank of America.'8 ' Mikey's Houses entered into a contract to
purchase a house foreclosed upon by Bank of America. The jury waiver
clause was in an addendum to the contract, and the addendum was
presented and signed after the contract was signed. In addressing
whether this provision was enforceable, the majority first determined that
a jury waiver must be reviewed with a rebuttable presumption against
waiver. 182 In order to rebut the presumption, Bank of America had the
burden to present prima facie evidence of a voluntary and knowing
waiver by the owners of Mikey's Houses. The court specified seven fac-
tors to be viewed in determining whether a waiver was made knowingly
and voluntarily: (1) the party's experience, (2) whether the party was rep-
resented by counsel, (3) whether the party's counsel had an opportunity
to examine the agreement, (4) the negotiation of the entire agreement,
(5) the negotiation of the waiver provision, (6) the conspicuousness of the
provision, and (7) the relative bargaining power of the parties. The court
analyzed all the factors, but indicated that proof of a knowing and volun-
tary waiver under any one of the factors was likely to carry the burden. 8 3
After a lengthy and detailed analysis of these factors, the court of appeals
concluded the presumption was not rebutted in this case. 184
In Startex First Equipment, Ltd. v. Aelina Enterprises, Inc.,185 the Aus-
tin Court of Appeals considered competing rights of first refusal. Startex
was the lessee of a lease agreement containing a right of first refusal. The
177. A merger clause specifies that the contract contains the entire agreement of the
parties and may not be changed except by written agreement. Practioners should be ex-
tremely careful in using the merger clause when terms are used for which definitions relate
to outside documentation.
178. Sefzik, 231 S.W.3d at 462.
179. Id. at 462.
180. Id. at 462-63.
181. 232 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2007, no pet.).
182. Id. at 150.
183. Id. However, the majority states in a footnote, that even if the waiver provision
was conspicuous, the evidence concerning the remaining factors rebuts any prima facie
showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver based on conspicuousness. Id. at 156 n.14.
184. Id. at 150-57.
185. 208 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet.).
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specific language of the right of first refusal said that only after the notice
of potential sale to the option holder and lapse of a seven day period
could the seller proceed with the sale, and further provided that "then
such sale shall be subject to the terms of this lease or any renewal
thereof." Two intervening sales of the property occurred without election
by Startex of its right of first refusal. However, when a proposed sale to
Aelina caused the then-owner to deliver the appropriate notice to
Startex, it then elected to exercise its option to purchase the property.
Aelina argued that the option was no longer effective due to the prior
conveyance without exercise. Rights of first refusal are bargained for
contractual provisions, and their scope must be determined in accordance
with contractual language. 186 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
right of first refusal provision survived the sale of the property because if
the property is sold subject to the terms of the lease agreement, and one
of the terms of the lease agreement is the right of first refusal, then the
right of first refusal survives all sales of the property. 187 Further, the
court held that the placement of the survival term inside of the right of
first refusal provision bolsters the interpretation that the right of first re-
fusal survived previous sales.188
Additionally, Aelina had a prior existing lease agreement with an op-
tion to purchase which was subsequent to the lease agreement of Startex,
but prior to its earnest money contract. Aelina asserted that it should be
entitled to exercise the option agreement under its lease agreement to
acquire the property from Startex. After having found no case law re-
garding competing rights of first refusal and options, the court concluded
that because Startex's purchase option existed prior to Aelina's, Aelina
had record notice and Startex's option had priority. Aelina's option was
extinguished upon Startex's exercise of the right of first refusal and
purchase of the property.1 89
VI. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
Four Brothers Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Cos.1 90 determined
what happened to an option to extend in a sublease when the master
lease is terminated. Four Brothers Boat Works, Inc. ("Four Brothers")
was a sublessee under a master lease held by Tesoro Petroleum Cos.
("Tesoro"). The master lease and the sublease each had a ten year pri-
mary term and two ten year options. Six years before the last ten year
option period, the property owner and master lessee entered into an
amendment of the master lease thereby terminating the last ten year op-
tion period and adding additional property under the master lease. This
information was not disclosed to the sublessee until after the date of the
186. Id. at 600.
187. Id. at 601.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 602.
190. 217 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
10952008] Real Property
SMU LAW REVIEW
commencement of the last ten year option-when the sublessee received
a notice to vacate the property based on the master lease termination.
After Four Brothers lost a previous lawsuit on the issue of posses-
sion,1 91 this suit was brought based upon various claims of breach of con-
tract, DTPA violations, fraud, and other issues. The relevant issue
addressed by the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District was
whether Tesoro had contractually obligated itself to provide the sublease
premises to the sublessee through the term of the option periods granted
in the sublease. The court looked to the language in the sublease and
found it unambiguous in providing that the options could be extended,
were for the benefit of the sublessee, and constituted a right the sublessee
was entitled to exercise and a right for which the sublessee had bar-
gained. 192 Although Four Brothers was not entitled to possession of the
subleased premises in the prior case, the court determined that the lease
language created a contractual liability of the master lessee that termina-
tion of the master lease could not extinguish.193 Consequently, the court
held that obligations under a sublease do not cease upon termination of
the master lease, but the sublease's remedy for such breaches of contracts
is an action for damages against the master lessee after termination of the
master lease.194
Kennedy v. Andover Place Apartments 95 involved a forcible detainer
action and the notice requirements under the Texas Property Code.
Here, the landlord sent the tenant a notice of termination and intent to
evict, which listed several grounds to support the termination of the lease
and notified the tenant that she had ten days to discuss the termination
and thirty days to vacate the premises. In construing this notice, the
Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District concluded that
such notice was inconsistent with Texas statutory law and that the forcible
detainer action was inappropriate.1 96 Under the Texas Property Code, a
landlord has the right to lawfully terminate a tenant's right to possession,
and the tenant commits a forcible detainer by refusing to surrender pos-
session.1 97 The tenant resided in a HUD rent-subsidized apartment, and
the lease in question specifically stated that a termination notice must
advise the tenant that she had ten days in which to discuss the proposed
termination of tenancy with the landlord. 198 Since Texas Property Code
section 24.005(e) requires a notice to vacate that may not be given until
the after the expiration of the time the tenant has to respond to the evic-
tion notice, two separate notices were required.199 The court concluded
191. See Four Bros. Boat Works v. S & SF, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 12, 14-15 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
192. Four Bros., 217 S.W.3d at 663.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 203 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
196. Id. at 497-98.
197. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a) (Vernon 2000).
198. Kennedy, 203 S.W.3d at 498.
199. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(e) (Vernon 2000).
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that because two separate notices were not sent, the requirements of the
lease and statute were not met.
z° °
2616 South Loop LLC v. Health Source Home Care, Inc. 201 involved a
determination of the validity of a lease and indicated the danger of sloppy
work in the preparation and execution of the lease, as well as presenta-
tion of evidence at trial. The lease in question was executed by Quad
Atrium Realty as lessor and given to Health Source Home Care, Inc. The
document was signed by D.H. Virani ("Virani"), who was identified as
the property manager for Quad Atrium Realty. However, at the time of
the lease, the property was actually owned by Quad Atrium Group Lim-
ited Partnership ("Quad Group LP").
On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District
found that there was no evidence submitted at trial that Virani or Quad
Atrium Realty were authorized to act on behalf of Quad Group LP.
20 2
The court decided this was sufficient to make the leases unenforceable
under both the statute of conveyances 20 3 and the statute of frauds.20 4 The
court held there was no evidence of actual authority presented at trial but
considered the tenant's contention of implied authority by reviewing
three documents.20 5 The deed conveying title to the property recited that
it was subject to rights of tenants in possession under unrecorded lease
agreements, but the court reasoned that such language did not acknowl-
edge the validity of the agency status of the person signing on behalf of
the lessor. The second document was an Assignment and Assumption of
Tenant Leases, which assigned the owner's interest in leases identified on
Exhibit B thereto, but Exhibit B was not attached. The third document, a
rent roll, was apparently provided by Quad Atrium Realty, and had a
heading of "Quad Atrium Realty Rent Roll," but made no reference to
the then property owner, Quad Group LP. The court concluded that
these documents were insufficient evidence to prove the authority of the
party signing the lease, or any ratification thereof by the owner or the
subsequent purchaser.
Further, the court found that although the tenant contended that Quad
Atrium Realty was the general partner of Quad Group LP, there was
insufficient evidence at trial to confirm it.20 6 Consequently, the leases
were held invalid.20 7 Good practice technique would dictate that parties
to a lease should determine and designate the true owner in order to
200. Kennedy, 203 S.W.3d at 498.
201. 201 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
202. Id. at 355.
203. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon 2004).
204. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
205. After the execution of the leases, the property was conveyed from Quad Group LP
to South Loop LLC and then to South Loop Companies. Id. at 355.
206. Id. at 357-58.
207. Id. at 358.
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prevent the harsh results of this case.208
In Charette v. Fitzgerald,209 the Houston Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth District addressed the difference in the definitions of aban-
donment in the Texas Property Code and the lease. 210 The Fitzgeralds
paid their rent through the end of the lease term, and gave notice of in-
tent to terminate more than the required sixty days before termination.
They removed most of their property from the premises, but some prop-
erty remained on June 29, 2004 (the lease termination date was July 30,
2004). During the last month of the lease, the Fitzgeralds agreed to move
the remaining property into the sunroom and board their pets in order to
allow the landlord to repaint the premises while they went on a twelve-
day trip. While the Fitzgeralds were on the trip, the landlord, who knew
of the trip, wrote numerous default letters and demands for vacation of
the premises. On July 10, 2004, the landlord changed the locks to the
premises even though the landlord knew the tenants were still out of
town. The trial court found the landlord wrongfully prevented the
Fitzgeralds from entering the property, but also determined that the
Fitzgeralds abandoned the property under the lease's abandonment
clause. The Texas Property Code provides that a landlord may not inten-
tionally prevent a tenant from re-entering premises except by judicial
process or for (1) bona fide repairs or an emergency, (2) removing the
contents of premises abandoned by a tenant, or (3) changing the locks of
a tenant who is delinquent in paying part of his rent.211 The abandon-
ment provision in the lease deemed the tenant to have abandoned the
premises if substantially all of the possessions were removed from the
leased premises or the tenant did not have a bed in which to sleep.212
However, the court concluded that the abandonment language in the
Texas Property Code was the appropriate governing principal and that
the lease provision would be given its plain meaning within the terms of
the statute.213 Thus, the court disregarded the trial court's finding under
the lease that the tenants abandoned the property on June 23, 2004, since
the actions of the tenant were not an abandonment within the contempla-
tion of the statute.214
VII. TITLE MATTERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Two cases in the area of adverse possession address the type of instru-
ments supporting a "duly registered deed" under the statutes. In the first,
208. Also, Exhibit B to the Assignment and Assumption of Leases, should have been
attached in the exercise of good practice and normally will carry the burden of ratification
of such leases.
209. 213 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
210. Id. at 510.
211. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0081(b) (Vernon 2007).
212. The exact lease clause is quoted at Charette, 213 S.W.3d at 510 n.2.
213. Id. at 511.
214. Id. at 510-11.
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Angell v. Bailey,215 the El Paso Court of Appeals found that a reservation
or exception in a deed in favor of a stranger to the deed did not convey
title and, in turn, would not support a chain of title. However, the reser-
vation exception could act as an estoppel by deed against the grantor, and
thus the grantor may be estopped to deny the existence of an interest it
has recognized in its exceptions.2 16 In the present case, the difficulty
arose because the exceptions to prior conveyances referred to deeds
which had never been recorded. Despite the lack of recordation, the
grantor was not permitted to disregard those conveyances.
2 17
In Johnson v. McClintock,21 8 a quitclaim was insufficient to support a
five year adverse possession claim.21 9 Because the five-year statute re-
quires the claim to be under a duly registered deed, a quitclaim deed is
insufficient because it passes only such interest as a grantor has and gen-
erally does not specify any particular interest.
220
Several cases evaluated other elements of adverse possession. In Tran
v. Macha,22 1 the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the element of
hostility.222 While hostility does not require an intention to dispossess a
rightful owner and a mistaken belief as to ownership may be sufficient,
there must be some open expression of intent to claim the property to the
exclusion of all others.223 Thus, neither mere occupancy without an in-
tention to appropriate nor joint use are sufficient to support a claim of
adverse possession.22
4
In Mead v. RLMC, Inc.,225 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed
the ten year adverse possession statute and casual fences. Adverse pos-
session is supported by cattle grazing if the area is "designedly en-
closed. ' '22 6 A casual fence may become a designed enclosure if the
claimant so changes the fence's character through substantial modifica-
tion.227 Repair and maintenance of an existing casual fence is not
enough.228 In this case, these issues created fact questions, and summary
judgment was inappropriate for either party despite cross motions.22 9
However, Chief Justice John Cayce wrote a dissenting opinion stating
that the adverse claimants had not sustained their burden, and that the
evidence conclusively established that the disputed property was not de-
215. 225 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.).
216. Id. at 842.
217. Id. at 841.
218. 202 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
219. Id. at 822-23.
220. Id.
221. 213 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. 2006).
222. Id. at 913.
223. ld.
224. Id. at 914-15.
225. 225 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2007, pet. denied).
226. Id. at 715.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 719.
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signedly enclosed. 230
The casual fence issue was also addressed in Myers v. Wright,231 where
the Dallas Court of Appeals found that the change of a barb wire fence to
a chain link fence created a fact question as to whether this constituted a
substantial modification of a casual fence.232
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Two cases dealt with deed interpretation this period. In the first, Ham-
ilton v. Morris Resources Ltd.,233 the San Antonio Court of Appeals re-
lied upon a fundamental rule of construction, the four-corners rule, to
limit its analysis to the language within the deed.23 4 The court sought to
harmonize all parts of the deed and give intent and effect to the clause at
issue. As a result, the clause "one-fourth interest in and to all the oil, gas
and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the fol-
lowing described lands ... 235 was found to convey a full one-fourth in-
terest, not just a one-fourth interest in any royalty payments pursuant to
an existing lease.236 Additionally, this interpretation was not subject to
quasi-estoppel arising from prior pooling agreements and division
orders.237
Somewhat to the contrary, in Morrison v. Robinson,238 the Waco Court
of Appeals found a deed that reserved minerals to be ambiguous and thus
a fact issue existed as to the parties' intent.239 The deed was ambiguous
because it was subject to two reasonable interpretations. 240 In particular,
the deed stated the following: "SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is
hereby reserved for Grantor ... an undivided one-half (1/2) interest of
the oil, gas and other minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned
by [Grantor] .... "241 According to the court, this clause can reasonably
interpreted to reserve either one-half or one-quarter of the Grantor's in-
terest.242 But, the dissent by Chief Justice Gray found only one interpre-
tation-that the Grantor only reserved one-fourth. 243
Also, with respect to bona fide purchaser status, in Fletcher v. Min-
ton 244 a purchaser of real property was put on notice of competing claims
to the property by the existence of cows, fencing, and equipment present
on the property-thus defeating the purchaser's claim of being a bona
230. Id. at 719-21.
231. 224 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
232. Id. at 470.
233. 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
234. Id. at 341.
235. Id. at 341.
236. Id. at 344.
237. Id. at 346-47.
238. 226 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
239. Id. at 475.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 474 (emphasis in original).
242. Id. at 475.
243. Id. at 476-78.





The courts were active in the area of easements this past year, which
often happens when there has been an active market for transfer of prop-
erty. In Crone v. Brumley,2 46 the San Antonio Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of an easement by necessity by pointing out the
distinction between necessity and a way of convenience. In this case, the
original roadway had become relatively impassable-requiring a four-
wheel drive vehicle. Although passage was difficult, that did not make
another more convenient passage way necessary, and thus, the require-
ments of an easement by necessity were not met.
247
Easement by necessity was also raised in Texas v. Beeson,248 but the
easement was sought across state owned lands. Sovereign immunity pro-
hibited claims to establish the easement.24 9 Moreover, an easement by
necessity could not be claimed in the absence of evidence that the
claimed easement had been used by previous owners since the time of
separation of the properties and the alleged creation of the easement by
necessity.25 0 Importantly, as noted by the Eastland Court of Appeals, not
only must a necessity exist at the time of the severance, an easement by
necessity is temporary because it is dependent on the existence of the
necessity that creates it.2 51
Likewise, addressing the questions of easements and the scope of his-
tory, the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District in Whaley v.
Central Church of Christ of Pearland2 52 reminded us that the scope of a
granted easement is limited to that which is reasonably necessary to enjoy
the rights granted by the easement.2 5 3 This case dealt with a sign ease-
ment, and the court limited the easement area to an area immediately
surrounding the sign. 254
Finally, a doctrine which has been finding its way into the courts more
often, easement by estoppel, was addressed in Cleaver v. Cundiff.2 55 An
easement by estoppel arises primarily through representations of a land-
owner upon which another has detrimentally relied.2 56 The representa-
tions may be verbal, and the doctrine of easement by estoppel is
accordingly an exception to the statute of frauds. 257 The doctrine should
245. Id. at 763.
246. 219 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
247. Id. at 70.
248. 232 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. abated).
249. Id. at 278.
250. Id. at 273-74.
251. Id. at 273.
252. 227 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
253. Id. at 231.
254. Id. at 232.
255. 203 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied).




not be confused with a prescriptive easement, which depends on princi-
ples of adverse possession. In Cleaver, the Eastland Court of Appeals
examined whether a purchaser of the servient estate may defeat an ease-
ment by estoppel through the theory of bona fide purchaser. While there
was no easement of record, the court found that the purchaser of the
servient estate had inquiry notice due to the overt existence of the road-
way and the purchaser's actual observation of the road, including some-
one driving down the road, prior to purchasing the property.258
Additionally, in this case, the owners of the dominant estate had not only
used and maintained the road, the public had also generally used the road
for access to the home located on the property.
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS
AND OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
Three cases were worthy of note in the area of restrictive covenants. In
the first, Girsh v. St. John,259 the Beaumont Court of Appeals found that
the statute of limitations began to run when a mobile home was placed on
property in violation of the restrictive covenants. Humorously, the court
found that the placement of the mobile home was inherently discoverable
because there was no evidence of use of artificial devices or methods to
camouflage or hide it.260 Thus, once the four-year statute of limitations
ran, the neighbors no longer could take steps to cause its removal based
upon the breach of the restrictive covenant.261
In Goddard v. Northampton Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.,262 the Amarillo
Court of Appeals was required to interpret restrictions created by a Dec-
laration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, the by-
laws of the homeowners association had been recorded. The court found
the recorded bylaws to be part of the dedicatory instruments that con-
trolled the operation of the homeowners' association and allowed the
board to establish, levy, and collect annual assessments in the amount of
the lien which attached.263
Also, Indian Beach Property Owners Ass'n v. Linden264 addressed the
difficult issue of dealing with enforcement of restrictions. In this case, the
property owners' association brought an action against the landowner
claiming that the erection of a chain link fence violated the deed restric-
tions. Generally, in an action to release or modify deed restrictions, all
owners in a subdivision are required to approve, but in this case, the
Houston Court of Appeals for the First District held that the landowner
could seek a declaratory judgment that the chain link fence did not vio-
258. Id. at 379.
259. 218 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.).
260. Id. at 927.
261. Id.
262. 229 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, no pet.).
263. Id. at 358.





In connection with conveying homestead property, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals in Geldard v. Watson26 6 reminded us that the convey-
ance of a homestead, even when separate property, must include the join-
der of the other spouse.2 6 7 However, failure to have the joinder of the
other spouse when the homestead is separate property does not void the
transaction as to the conveying spouse but is inoperative to cut off the
continuing homestead claim of the non-joining spouse. 268 In this case,
even though the husband was aware of the conveyance, his silence or
failure to act served as neither a valid joinder nor a ratification.269 Ratifi-
cation required a formal recognition of the conveyance through execution
of an agreement.270 Also, of interest, the court considered the homestead
right to an estate in land, and thus decided the justice court did not have
jurisdiction to determine the joinder and ratification issues.271
Three cases addressed questions of abandonment of the homestead,
but within slightly different contexts. In Florey v. Estate of McConnell,272
a surviving husband charged with murdering his wife pledged the home-
stead to secure attorney's fees incurred in connection with his defense.
The wife's estate brought a declaratory judgment action to quiet title and
remove the deed of trust. A deed of trust against a homestead for attor-
ney's fees would normally be void as an impermissible lien under the
Texas Constitution, but the attorney contended that the homestead had
been abandoned before execution of the deed of trust. The Austin Court
of Appeals found that homestead character could only be lost through
abandonment, death, or alienation, and that proof of the abandonment
must be "undeniably clear. ' 273 Because the homestead character of the
property was not lost through abandonment in this situation, the attor-
ney's deed of trust lien did not attach.274 The court also spent some time
discussing the issue of recovery of attorney's fees, noting that suits to
quiet title did not permit the recovery of attorney's fees, and a declara-
tory judgment action-which was essentially the same as a trespass to try
title-would also not support the recovery of attorney's fees by the es-
tate.2 75 However, in this case, the court found that this dispute was not
the same as a trespass to try title, but rather a direct attack on the deed of
trust seeking to create an interest-thus the claim for attorney's fees was
265. Id. at 698, 700.
266. 214 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
267. Id. at 208.
268. Id. at 708-09.
269. Id. at 208.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 209.
272. 212 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied).
273. Id. at 443-44.
274. Id. at 447.




A second abandonment case, Pierce v. Washington Mutual Bank,277
noted that a party could only have one homestead at a time.2 78 However,
again, the question of abandonment was closely examined. The court
noted that while establishing a new homestead constitutes an abandon-
ment of the old homestead as a matter of law, abandonment of home-
stead may nevertheless be established without fully establishing a new
homestead.2 79 Without a clear establishment of a new homestead, the
requirement that finding abandonment requires a factual determination
of an intent not to return. 280
Finally, Churchill v. Mayo281 also re-emphasized the difficulty of find-
ing an abandonment of the homestead. Temporary absence for reasons
of health were insufficient to show an abandonment.282
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE
The statute of limitations was addressed in the context of nuisance in a
case where a cable company had trespassed by the placement of cable
lines across the plaintiff's property in Krohns v. Marcus Cable Associates,
L.P.2 83 A single wrongful act, which was the source of a continuing in-
jury, was not a "continuing tort. '284 In the case of a continuing tort, limi-
tations do not accrue until the tortious conduct ceases and thus, a claim
for damages was not available to the landowner. 285 Furthermore, the
plaintiff sought an injunction requiring the cable company to remove the
cable line from the property, but because the cable company had already
taken steps to remove the cable line, the Waco Court of Appeals declared
the issue moot.286 Accordingly, no damages, no injunction, and, obvi-
ously, no attorney's fees were awarded. 287
B. BROKERS
In Gray & Co. Realtors, Inc. v. Atlantic Housing Foundation, Inc.,288
the issue of when a commission was earned was addressed by specific
reference to the agreement. In this case, the Representation Agreement
provided for a brokerage commission "if the sale transaction was con-
276. Id. at 449.
277. 226 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet. denied).
278. Id. at 715.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 714-15.
281. 224 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
282. Id. at 345.
283. 201 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
284. Id. at 880-81.
285. Id. at 879-81.
286. Id. at 882.
287. Id.
288. 228 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
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summated or closed." Unlike many standard listing agreements which
provide for a commission if a ready, willing, and able buyer is provided,
in this case there was a specific requirement that the transaction close
before a commission was payable. The Dallas Court of Appeals adopted
the definition from Black's Law Dictionary 272 (8th ed. 2004) and stated:
The word "closing" is a term of art commonly used in real-estate
transactions and is defined as "[tihe final meeting between the par-
ties to a transaction, at which the transaction is consummated; esp.,
in real estate, the final transaction between the buyer and seller,
whereby the conveyancing documents are concluded and the money
and property transferred. 289
Without a closing, no commission was payable.2 90
C. WATER RIGHTS
Three reported cases dealing with different aspects of water rights are
worthy of mention for the covered period. In the first, Texas Woman's
University v. Methodist Hospital,291 the Houston Court of Appeals for the
First District delved into the definition of surface water, determining that
surface water was characterized by its "inability to maintain an identity
and existence as a body of water, distinguishing it from water flowing in a
natural water course. ' 292 Surface water does not follow a defined course
or channel and does not gather into or form a natural body of water.293
In this case, a hospital's construction, which included parking lots, caused
runoff of rain water to enter into the tunnel system for the TWU campus.
The hospital contended that the waters overflowed existing flood protec-
tion measures and were not surface water subject to the statutory prohibi-
tion of the Texas Water Code-rather, it argued the waters were
floodwater for which they were not liable. 294 Whether or not the rain
water was surface water or flood water was a question of fact and not
subject to summary judgment.295 The conduct of the hospital in under-
taking to address flooding issues, including flood logs and control of wa-
ters through the tunnel system, permitted negligence and nuisance claims,
but not a trespass claim.296
In Hix v. Robertson,297 a private creek which previously had not been a
navigable stream became such when the creek was dammed and formed a
lake. Thus, the public could utilize the waters of the creek for fishing.298
Finally, in TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.,299 the
289. Id. at 434.
290. Id. at 436-37.
291. 221 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]. 2006, no pet.).
292. Id. at 278 (internal quotations omitted).
293. Id.
294. TEX. WATER CODE § 11.086 (Vernon 2008).
295. Id. at 279-80.
296. Id. at 285-86.
297. 211 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
298. Id. at 428.
299. 218 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
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plight of landowners tidal subjected to tidal waters was again apparent.
The landowner, whose lands became submerged in a tidal flat, lost those
lands because submerged lands are owned by the state.300 The land-
owner, also, could not recreate title through self-help by constructing a
diversion and seeking to utilize principles of accretion.301 This case also
included an extended and useful reference analyzing principles of bound-
ary disputes and survey interpretation. 30 2
300. Id. at 179.
301. Id. at 199.
302. See id. at 203-08.
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